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THE RIGHT TO RELIGION-BASED EXEMPTIONS 
IN EARLY AMERICA: THE CASE OF 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TO 
CONSCRIPTION 
Ellis M. West* 
One of the more controversial decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court in recent years was its decision in the case of Em-
ployment Division, Oregon v. Smith,1 which raised t}le basic issue 
of whether the free exercise clause of the First Amendment2 guar-
antees a right to religion-based exemptions, i.e., whether it gives 
persons and groups a prima facie right to be exempt from having to 
obey valid laws when they have religious reasons for noncompli-
ance. More specifically, in Smith, two Native Americans claimed 
that their prosecution for using an illegal drug, peyote, was pre-
cluded by the free exercise clause ·because they had taken the drug 
as part of a religious ceremony of their church. 3 
To the surprise of many,4 the Supreme Court rejected both the 
Native Americans' claim (by a vote of six to three) and the general 
proposition that the free exercise clause gives persons a right to 
religion-based exemptions (by five to four).5 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Scalia said, "We have never held that an individual's 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia 
1. 494 us 872 (1990). 
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof .... " US Constitution, Amend I. 
3. Technically, the Smith case raised only the question of whether the state of Oregon 
could, consistent with the free exercise clause, deny unemployment compensation to per-
sons who had taken peyote and had then been dismissed from their jobs for having done 
so. The Court said, however, that because the taking of peyote was illegal in Oregon, the 
answer to that question turned on whether a criminal prosecution of the Native Americans 
was precluded by the free exercise clause because they had ingested the drug as part of a 
religious ceremony. If it was not, then, according to the Court, their being denied unem-
ployment compensation was also not precluded by the clause. Employment Division, Ore-
gon v Smith, 494 US 872, 875-76 (1990). 
4. Richard John Neuhaus claims that the decision "took almost everyone by surprise, 
leaving some breathless, some outraged, and most puzzled." Polygamy, Peyote, and the 
Public Peace, First Things 64 (October 1990). 
5. Justice O'Connor was the justice who voted to deny the claim of the Native Ameri-
cans but disagreed with the majority's reason for doing so. Employment Division, Oregon 
v Smith, 494 US 872, 891-907 (1990)(0'Connor, J., concurring). 
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valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."6 
Moreover, in order to preclude such a holding in the future, the 
Court discarded the "strict scrutiny" test, adopted in its 1963 Sher-
bert v. Verner decision' according to which any burden on any reli-
gious practice imposed by any law, even one that is religion-neutral 
and generally applicable, is unconstitutional unless it can be justi-
fied by a "compelling" government interest and· is the least ,restric-
tive means of protecting that interest.8 The Court said that the free 
exercise clause requires only that lawi:; be religion-neutral and gen-
erally applicable. It added, however, that although courts were not 
required to, legislatures were free to grant religion-based exemp-
tions from :valid, secular laws as a way of alleviating incidental bur-
dens on the exercise of religion.9 Because of the Smith decision, 
governments can now regulate and even criminalize practices that 
some persons or groups consider to.be religious in nature, provided 
it does so through a law that is constitutional and that is applied to 
all instances of the practice, secular as well as religious. 
The Smith decision was met with a great deal of strident criti-
cism by most spokespersons for .religion and churches and by some 
constitutional law scholars.10 The decision also had the effect of 
galvanizing just about all the religious organizations and religious 
6. ·-Employment Division, Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872, 878-79 (1990). 
7. 374 us 398 (1963). . 
8. Employment Division, Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872, 884-89 (1990). According to 
Justice Scalia, the Sherbert test was a· "dead letter.''. He pointed out that although the 
Court had paid lip service to the test in several of its opinions, it had never used the test, 
with one_ exception (in cases involving denial of unemployment compensation), to protect 
the exercise of religion from valid, non-discriminatory laws, even though it had had many 
opportunities to do so. Id at 883-84. In other words, in its Smith decision the Court was 
simply "calling a spade a spade." Therefore, "it is hard to conclude that Smith has radically 
altered the likely outcome of free exercise cases." Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Under-
standing of the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L Rev 597 (Spring 
1991). 
9. Employment Division, Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872, 890 1990). , 
10. For a brief sampling of critical comments, see James E. Wood, Jr., The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 33 J of Church and State 674-75 (Autumn 1991). Perhaps the 
leading critic from the ranks of religious spokespersons has been Richard John Neuhaus, 
editor of the periodical, First Things. .See Polygamy, Peyote, and the Public Peace, First 
Things 63-68 (October 1990); In Response: Weighing the Risks, First Things 53-54 (Febru-
ary 1991); and A New Order of Religious Freedom, First Things 13-17 (February 1992). 
The most outspoken of the legal scholars who have criticized the Court has been Douglas 
Laycock, Professor of Law at the University of Texas Law School. See Watering Down the 
Free-Exercise Clause, 107 Christian Century 518-19 (May 16-23, 1990); The Remnants of 
Free Exercise, in Supreme Court Review 1990, ed G. Casper et al 1-68 (University of Chi-
cago Press, 1991); The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief 
That Was Never Filed, 8 J Law & Relig 99-114 (1990); and Summary and Synthesis: The 
Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 841-56 (March 1992). 
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liberty groups in this country toward an effort for reversal either by
the Supreme Court or by Congress." As of now, they have not
been successful in getting the Court to overrule Smith, and, in fact,
in its most important free exercise case since Smith, the Court re-
fused to overturn its prior holding that the free exercise clause does
not guarantee a right to religion-based exemptions. 12
On the other hand, Coigress has responded to the pressures
exerted on it to do something about the Smith decision. It passed
the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993" (RFRA).13 The
key part of RFRA states that government may restrict the free ex-
ercise of religion only if it can show that the restriction "(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."4 In short, Congress has legislatively mandated the
"strict scrutiny" test that the Supreme Court discarded in Smith. In
the future, therefore, claims for religion-based exemptions will
most likely be based on this Act, rather than on the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. Whether it will significantly in-
crease the freedom of religious persons and groups to disobey valid
laws remains to be seen, however.' 5
One of the most frequently made arguments against the Smith
decision is that it is inconsistent with the true meaning of the free
exercise clause. Persons who make such an argument often resort
to a literal interpretation of the words of the free exercise clause.
They assume that the word "exercise" refers to "action," "prac-
tice," or "application" and that the'word "free" means "without
legal restraint."' 6 Using such a literal interpretation of the free ex-
ercise clause, they naturally think that the clause is violated, at
least presumptively, by any law whose application imposes any
burden on any conduct that any person deems to be part of her/her
11. Wood, (cited in note 10, at 675-76).
12. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 113 S Ct 2217 (1993).
13. Freedom of worship bill signed into law, Richmond limes-Dispatch, November 17,
1993, p A2.
14. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub L No 103-141, sec 3, 107 Stat
1488 (1993).
15. For arguments against the Act, see Philip H. Harris, Leaping Headfirst Into the
Smith Trap, First Things 37-39 (February 1991), and Mark E. Chopko, et al, How To Re-'
store Religious Freedom: A Debate, First Things 37-48 (April 1992).
16. See, for example; John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free
Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v Smith, 25 Indiana L Rev 102-03 (1991); Stephen
Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, BYU L Rev
12-13 (1993); and Kmiec (cited in note 8, at 597).
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religion-even if the law itself and its application to persons gener-
ally are unquestionably constitutional. Douglas Laycock, for ex-
ample, writes, "The free exercise clause . . is an express
substantive protection for certain conduct, for religious exercise, "17
and argues that "on its face" the law involved in the Smith case
"would seem to be a 'law prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]'
",18
Most of those who defend a right to religion-based exemptions
rely on more than the wording of the First Amendment. They also
argue that it was the intention of the framers of the First Amend-
ment to create a right to religion-based exemptions. Donald Gian-
nella, for example, says that "the historic purpose of the free
exercise clause" was to create a right to religion-based exemptions
from such laws as a general ban on the consumption of alcohol.19
Similarly it has been claimed that "the first amendment was in-
tended to protect freedom of conscience, and that conscientious
objection to war was a well recognized, time honored expression of
such conscience. 12 0
In either case, i.e., whether they are based on the text or on
the original intent of the free exercise clause, the arguments for a
constitutional right to religion-based exemptions are wrong-my
opinion. Those who rely on the text of the First Amendment fail to
realize that their understanding of the phrase "free exercise of reli-
gion" is not the understanding that was held by those early Ameri-
cans who used the phrase and fought for its inclusion in the
constitutions of that age. Their reliance on the wording of the First
Amendment is, in fact, a classic example of how a literal reading of
a constitutional or other legal text can be completely misleading
because the meaning of words and phrases changes over time.2
Thus, an examination of the historical record clearly indicates that
in eighteenth-century America the phrase "free exercise of reli-
17. Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise. . ., (cited in note 10, at
112) (emphasis in original).
18. Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, (cited in note 10, at 3).
19. Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 1. The Reli-
gious Liberty Guarantee, 80 Harv L Rev 1388 (May 1967).
20. Harrop A. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U Pa Law Review 813
(April 1958).
21. See Paul K. Conkin, Freedom: Past Meanings and Present Prospects, in Freedom in
America: A 200-Year Perspective, N. A. Graebner, ed, 205-22 (Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity Press, 1977). A good example of a phrase whose contemporary meaning is different
from its eighteenth century one is "freedom of conscience." See William Lee Miller, The
First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic 122-23 (Alfred Knopf, 1986).
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gion" stood for religious freedom in general and was used primar-
ily to attack laws and policies associated with traditional
establishments of religion, including those that authorized public
financing of religion.22 Although this fact, by itself, does not pre-
clude the possibility that the phrase "free exercise of religion" was
originally meant also to guarantee a right to religion-based exemp-
tions, it does demonstrate that one cannot say on the basis of its
wording alone that the free exercise clause guarantees a right to
such exemptions, for a literal interpretation of that clause leads to
a meaning that is far narrower than and different from the meaning
originally imputed to those words.
Likewise, those who rely on the intentions of the founders to
justify the argument for a right to religion-based exemptions can
find very little historical evidence to substantiate their claim.23 To
the extent that there is historical evidence bearing on the issue,
most scholars who have examined it have concluded that the free
exercise clause was not intended to guarantee a right to religion-
based exemptions.24  To my knowledge, only one study of any
length-a 1990 article in the Harvard Law Review by the law pro-
fessor, Michael McConnell'-comes close to arguing the contrary,
and its conclusion is guarded and qualified: "[Clonstitutionally
compelled exemptions were within the contemplation of the framers
and ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free exercise clause
.... While the historical evidence may not be unequivocal (it sel-
dom is), it does, on balance, support Sherbert's interpretation of
22. See Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Pas-
sage of the First Amendment 134-48, 176-77, 190-91, 217-21 (Oxford University Press,
1986); Thomas E. Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787 22, 115
(University Press of Virginia, 1977); and M. Paulson, Religion, Equality, and the Constitu-
tion: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame
L Rev 312-26 (1986).
23. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exer-
cise Exemption, 7 J Law & Relig 379-83 (1989).
24. See Michael Malbin, Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First
Amendment 28, 35-40 (American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Walter Berns, The First
Amendment and the Future of American Democracy 35-55 (Basic Books, 1976); Richard
Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion 23 (Free Press, 1972); Ellis West, The Case
Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 Notre Dame J Law, Ethics & Pub Po'y,
623-33 (1990); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song
of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L Rev 245-319 (Winter 1991); and Philip A. Hamburger, A Con-
stitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 Geo Wash L Rev
915-48 (April 1992).
25. The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L
Rev 1410-1517 (May 1990).
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the free exercise clause." 26 At about the same time, McConnell
also wrote elsewhere that "the Court [in Smith] could have said
that there are two constitutional traditions, both with impressive
pedigrees, and that persons of common sense and good will have
come down on both sides of the question."27 Moreover, McCon-
nell's evidence and reasoning have been sharply criticized.28 In
spite of its cautious and questionable conclusion, most critics of the
Smith decision cite McConnell's article for the proposition that that
decision is inconsistent with the original meaning of the free exer-
cise clause.29
In any case, because so many persons, including legal scholars,
have criticized the Supreme Court's Smith decision. on the unexam-
ined assumption that the free exercise clause of the First Amend-
ment was intended to guarantee a right to religion-based
exemptions, in this article I present part of the evidence that dem-
onstrates that the clause was NOT intended to do so and, there-
fore, that the Smith decision is not only consistent with, but
required by the original meaning of the clause.3° Only part of the
26. Id at 1415 (emphasis added).
27. Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1119 (Summer
1990).
28. Sherry, Lee v Weisman: Paradox Redux, in Supreme Court Review 1992 123, 147,
148 n 102 (D. Hutchinson et al ed 1993); Bradley (cited in note 24); and Hamburger (cited
in note 24). For a harsh, but, in my opinion, valid criticism of "law office history" of First
Amendment provisions, see Oscar Handlin, The Bill of Rights in Its Context, 62 The Amer-
ican Scholar 177-78 (Spring 1993).
29. See, for example, Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise ...
(cited in note 10, at 102) ("The [Smith] opinion is inconsistent with original intent....
McConnell shows that legislatures in the founding generation considered exemptions from
facially neutral laws to be part of the free exercise of religion . . . ."); Delaney, (cited in
note 16, at 121, n 8) ("The absence of a detailed historical grounding of the Sherbert hold-
ing and rationale has been remedied by Michael's McConnell's recent article."); and Rob-
ert N. Anderton, Just Say No to Judicial Review: The Impact of Oregon v Smith on the Free
Exercise Clause, 76 Iowa L Rev 817, n 114 (May 1991) (McConnell concludes "that both
the framers' and popular notions of religious liberty at the time of the framing most likely
contemplated religious exemptions from generally applicable laws with secular pur-
poses.")(emphasis added). Moreover, because of McConnell's national reputation as a
constitutional law scholar, especially in the area of church and state, and because it was
published in the Harvard Law Review, his one article on the original meaning of the free
exercise clause has probably had more influence on the debate over the meaning of the
free exercise clause than that of all the other works combined.
30. Even if I were able to show in this paper that my position on the original meaning
of the free exercise clause is correct, that would not mean that the Supreme Court neces-
sarily decided the Smith case correctly. Such a conclusion would follow only if constitu-
tional cases must be decided, at least when possible, on the basis of the "original intent" of
the framers. In this paper, however, I do not defend such a position. Indeed, I acknowl-
edge that arguments other than textual and historical ones can be made in defense of per-
sons' having a constitutional right to religion-based exemptions. Elsewhere, however, I
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evidence is presented here because a presentation of all the evi-
dence needed to make the case for such an understanding of the
free exercise clause would require a discussion of all the following
topics: (1) the views of the leading proponents of religious liberty
in early America on the issue of a right to religion-based exemp-
tions; (2) the wording and meaning of the religious liberty provi-
sions that were in the various colonial charters and state
constitutions prior to the adoption of the First Amendment; (3) the
clashes that occurred in early America between the demands of
particular laws and the demands of religious conscience; and (4)
the setting, wording, and events involved in the actual writing and
adoption of the First Amendment.
This article addresses only the third topic: what exemptions
from specific laws (if any) were sought and granted on the grounds
that they were guaranteed by the religious liberty provisions in the
various colonial charters and early state constitutions? More spe-
cifically, it explores whether or not early Americans believed that
Quakers and others who conscientiously objected to military ser-
vice had either a natural or constitutional right, derived from the
principle of religious freedom, to be exempt from having to obey
conscription laws. It concludes that they did not so believe.
I focus on the issue of conscientious objection to military ser-
vice for two reasons. First, the historical record contains very few
other examples of serious clashes between the claims of conscience
and the claims of valid, secular laws, especially clashes where ex-
emptions were claimed as natural or constitutional rights. 1 Some
scholars have explained this absence of conflict on the grounds that
in early America there were relatively few laws that had the poten-
tial to conflict with the practice of religion32 and there was wide-
have considered many, if not all, of these arguments and found them wanting. See West
(cited in note 24, at 600-21).
31. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ., (cited in note 25, at
1466) ("the issue of exemptions did not often arise"); Marshall, (cited in note 23, at 380)
("The framers obviously were aware that the beliefs of religious adherents could stand in
opposition to the religious mandates of the state .... However, outside of these conflicts
with state religious laws or test requirements, it is difficult to find examples where religious
objections to the secular laws of the state were recognized.")
32. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding. . ., (cited in note 25, at
1466) ("the governments of that era were far less intrusive than the governments of to-
day."); Marshall, (cited in note 23, at 382) ("The regulatory state did not exist."). Such an
argument, however, may reflect more of an idealized view than an accurate account of the
scope and significance of government at that time. Even if the number of statutes in exist-
ence was relatively small, as compared to the number in existence today, that is hardly the
whole story. Not only were the common law and local government much more important
367]
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spread consensus on moral principles and, thus, on the goals and
laws of government.33 Nevertheless, the small number of conflicts
between conscience and law in early America is by itself a very
convincing reason for thinking that the framers of the First
Amendment simply did not "envision potential religious exemp-
tions as applying to neutral laws of general applicability. 3 4
In any case, in eighteenth-century America, there was at least
one significant, widespread conflict between religious conscience
and secular law-that between conscription laws and conscientious
objectors. The way in which that conflict was resolved, therefore,
should indicate whether early Americans believed that they had a
natural or constitutional right to at least one religion-based
exemption.
The second reason for focusing on the issue of conscious ob-
jection to military service is the fact that leading defenders of a
general constitutional right to religion-based exemptions cite the
treatment of conscientious objectors in early America as evidence
supporting the proposition that early Americans believed in such a
right.35 McConnell calls it "a particularly telling example. '36 Even
some scholars who deny that the principle of religious liberty in
early America entailed a general right to religion-based exemp-
tions concede that exemptions from conscription laws were given
to conscientious objectors on the basis of religious liberty. For ex-
ample, John K. Wilson writes, "Though in practically all matters
civil law could not be violated because of religious beliefs, consci-
entious objection to war was considered an exception." 37 There-
fore, if, as this article contends, the historical evidence on the
in regulating the lives of citizens than they are today, but law in general was much more
likely than it is today to have the promotion of virtue as one of its aims and thus to regulate
aspects of life that today are considered personal or private and beyond the scope of civil
authority. See David Flaherty, "Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early America,"
in American Law and the Constitutional Order: Historical Perspectives, L. M. Friedman and
H. N. Scheiber, eds, 69-84 (Harvard University Press, 1978); Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 1-16 (Harvard University Press, 1977); and
Conkin, (cited in note 21, at 208-09).
33. Curry, (cited in note 22, at 79, 218-19); McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding. . ., (cited in note 25, at 1466); and Marshall, (cited in note 23, at 382-83).
34. Marshall, (cited in note 23, at 381).
35. See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1266 (Founda-
tion Press, 1988, 2nd ed); McConnell, (cited in note 25, at 1468-69); and Freeman (cited in
note 20, at 813).
36. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ... (cited in note 25, at
1468).
37. Religion Under the State Constitutions, 1776-1800, 32 J Church & State (Autumn
1990). Also, see Marshall, (cited in note 23, at 380-81 fn 95).
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conscription controversy does not support such a conclusion, then
it follows that the historical case for a right to religion-based ex-
emptions derived from the free exercise clause has a large hole in
it, for there is no other controversy from early America that can
provide evidence toward making such a case.
I. THE GENERAL TREATMENT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
IN EARLY AMERICA
By the time of the Revolution, Americans generally were
aware of the fact that Quakers and members of a few other reli-
gious sects, such as the Brethren and the Mennonites, were paci-
fists who refused for religious reasons to take up arms in defense of
themselves or others.38 Many Americans, moreover, were sympa-
thetic to the moral plight that conscription laws created for the pac-
ifists. For example, in 1775, shortly before the outbreak of the
Revolution, the Continental Congress, in response to an appeal
from pacifists in Pennsylvania, expressed the following sentiment:
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot
bear arms in any case, the Congress intended no violence to
their consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to con-
tribute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of
their distressed brethren in the several colonies, and to do all
other services to their oppressed Country, which they can con-
sistently with their religious principles. 39
As a result of such sympathy, exemptions from conscription laws
were often granted to religious conscientious objectors before, dur-
ing, and after the Revolution.4° Five of the newly independent
states-Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Hampshire, Vermont, and
New York--went so far as to put provisions granting such exemp-
tions in their constitutions.'
38. "Nonresistance was a deeply ingrained and 'popular' doctrine among Mennonites,
Quakers, Brethren, and Schwenkfelders. There were few waverers." Richard K. MacMas-
ter et al, 1739-1789 525 (1979).
39. Quoted in McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ..., (cited in note
25, at 1469). Although McConnell says that in these words the Continental Congress was
granting exemptions, id at 1468, it was at best expressing only an opinion or hope, for the
revolutionary army consisted of state militias, exemptions from which could only be
granted by the state governments. Richard W. Renner, Conscientious Objection and the
Federal Government, 1787-1792, 38 Military Affairs 142 (December 1974).
40. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding . ., (cited in note 25, at
1468-69).
41. The provisions in the constitutions of Delaware, New Hampshire, and Vermont
were worded essentially the same as the provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776: "Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly com-
3671
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One cannot infer from such exemptions, however, means that
early Americans generally believed that conscientious objectors to
war have a natural or constitutional right to such exemptions. One
cannot infer this for three reasons. First, the exemptions were
granted by legislatures, not courts. After all, the majority of the
states did not have constitutional provisions requiring exemptions
and even if they did, it made no practical difference, for judicial
review had not yet been established in the nation.42 When clashes
arose between their conscience and a conscription law, therefore,
pacifists did not go to courts and attempt to get exemptions from
the law by arguing that a religious liberty provision in a charter or
constitution required such exemptions to be given. Rather, when
they sought to obtain exemptions from an existing or proposed
draft law, they went to the legislative. body responsible for passing
the law.43
Second, when persons, seeking exemptions went to legisla-
tures, they did not necessarily argue that the legislatures were le-
gally or morally bound by either natural law or a constitution to
grant the exemptions. Often the exemptions were requested as
special favors or privileges, and appeals were made to the legisla-
tors' sympathy or self-interest, i.e., their need of votes.44 Likewise,
pelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent ..... Sources of our Liberties, Richard L.
Perry, ed, 330 (American Bar Foundation, 1959). For the provisions in the constitutions of
Delaware, Vermont, and New Hampshire, respectively, see id, 339, 365, and 383. New
York's constitution (1777) gave exemptions only to "the people called Quakers as, from
scruples of conscience, may be averse to the bearing of arms . . . " The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and. Other Organic Laws, Francis N. Thorpe, ed, 5:2637
(Government Printing Office, 1909). Although Massachusetts is sometimes included
among those states whose constitution contained a provision exempting conscientious ob-
jectors, its wording clearly indicates that the Massachusetts provision was not designed just
for conscientious objectors nor included because of the principle of religious liberty.. The
provision reads as follows: "Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it
in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws. He is
obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of this protection; to give his
personal service, or an equivalent, when necessary .... " See Perry (cited earlier in this
note at 375).
42. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism.. .," (cited in note 27, at 1119).
43. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding. . ., (cited in note 25, at
1445, 1473, 1510).
44. Regarding one group of pacifists in Pennsylvania, Richard MacMaster writes,"...
Mennonites did not necessarily see the distinction between being subjects [of feudal
princes] and being citizens of the more modern kind. ... Instead of having the outlook of
modern citizens [with certain rights], they seem rather to have been trading votes for paci-
fist privileges, much as in Europe they had traded money, in the form of special taxes and
gifts to protective princes, for those privileges." Land, Piety, Peoplehood 230 (Herald
Press, 1985). Also, see Theron F. Schlabach, Mennonites, Revivalism, Modernity-1683-
1850, 48 Church History 398-415 (Dec 1979).
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when legislatures did grant exemptions, they usually did so out of
sympathy, not because they thought the claimants had a right to
them. Thus, exemptions from conscription laws were usually
granted by legislatures as "privileges" or "indulgences," not as
"rights," and even then there was often strong opposition to such
grants.45
Third, even when specific constitutional provisions were cited
as the reasons for granting exemptions46 one cannot infer that the
exemptions were sought as "rights" in the modern sense of the
word, for the colonial charter and state constitutional provisions
guaranteeing various freedoms were not understood as rigid re-
straints on a government's power or as guarantees 6f anything like
absolute rights to its citizens. Rather, such provisions were thought
of as statements of goals or ideals that a government was obligated
to realize as much as it could, but only after taking into account all
its competing objectives and responsibilities 47
Not surprisingly, therefore, even Michael McConnell concedes
that the existence of exemptions for 'conscientious objectors does
not prove "that religious objectors were entitled to exemptions by
right."48 Nevertheless, in lawyer-like fashion, he refuses to con-
cede the point entirely. First, he argues that many of the rights in
the Constitution came to be included therein because prior to 1789
they had been recognized in state statutes or the common law and
that it is very likely that the right to exemption from military duty
was one of those rights. He reasons, "If legislatures conceived of
exemptions as an appropriate response to conflicts between law
and conscience, there is every reason to suppose that the framers
and ratifiers of the federal Constitution would expect judicially en-
forceable constitutional protections for religious conscience to be
interpreted in much the same manner. '49
45. Francis J. Corklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Tor-
caso v Watkins, 51 Georgetown lJ 257 (Winter 1963), and Renner, (cited in note 39, at
142).
46. For examples, see MacMaster, et al, (cited in note 38, at 238, 266).
47. Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, 1776-1791, in Liberty and
Community 55-56, 64-86 (Oceana Pub, 1987); Alfred H. Kelly et al, The American Consti-
tution: Its Origins and Development 76 (W. W. Norton, 1991, 7th ed); and John P. Reid,
The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution 4 (University of Chicago
Press, 1988).48. Free Exercise Revisionism.. 
., (cited in note 27, at 1118-19). McConnell adds that
the existence of such exemptions is "fully consistent with the position in Smith .... " Id at
1119.
49. Id at 1119.
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There is not, however, "every reason" to accept McConnell's
supposition. Although some rights granted by statute or the com-
mon law were indeed elevated into judicially enforceable Constitu-
tional rights, most were not so elevated. Thus, the mere fact that a
right to be exempt from fighting in wars was granted by some state
legislatures (and even constitutions) does not mean that it was one
of those rights that came to be guaranteed by the Constitution. Af-
ter all, the issue at that time was precisely which of the many ex-
isting statutory or common law rights should be protected by the
new federal Constitution.
McConnell's second reason for thinking that conscientious ob-
jector exemptions, even though granted by legislatures, were
viewed as "rights" is the possibility that "the exemptions were
granted because legislatures believed the free exercise principle re-
quired them."5 Although his reasoning here is sound, McConnell
fails to give any evidence showing that the exemptions were in fact
granted for such a reason. He simply asserts that such "seems to
be the case."51
Nevertheless, McConnell's argument does raise a relevant
question. Were the exemptions that were given to conscientious
objectors by either state statutes or constitutions given on the
grounds that they were required by the principle of religious lib-
erty? If they were, that fact would clearly imply that the exemp-
tions were considered to be rights. The evidence, however,
indicates that in most cases they were not. First, many of the paci-
fists themselves did not claim that the unavailability of exemptions
constituted a violation of religious freedom. Thus, Stephen B.
Week's extensive account of Quakers in the southern colonies/
states contains no material linking Quaker demands for exemp-
tions from conscription with the principle of religious freedom.52
Although many of the petitions submitted by pacifists to colonial
or state legislatures did request exemptions on the grounds that
50. The Origins and Historical Understanding..., (cited in note 25, at 1473).
51. Id.




they were required by the principle of religious liberty, 53 many did
not do so, but essentially "begged for mercy."
Second, exemptions from military service were given to many
other persons besides conscientious objectors. Absolute or uncon-
ditional exemptions were, for practical reasons, given to a broad
range of persons, such as government officials and doctors. More-
over, in many states, because of the general hostility to compulsory
military service, almost anyone who was willing and able either to
pay a "fine" or to secure a substitute could receive an exemption.55
This means that the exemptions given to religious objectors were
not all that special or necessarily based on the principle of religious
liberty. 6
A final point on this issue: the state constitutions that con-
tained a provision exempting pacifists from conscription laws also
contained a religious liberty provision, and the two provisions were
in completely separate, unrelated sections.5 7 The clear implication
of the choice both to make a separate provision for conscientious
objection and to place it away from the religious liberty provision is
53. For example, in 1785, members of the Mennonite Church in Virginia petitioned
the Virginia General Assembly for a law that would exempt them from both serving in the
military and having to pay a penalty for not doing so. In the petition they said that their
ancestors had come "to America to Seek Religious Liberty," which they had enjoyed "ex-
cept by the Infliction of penalties for not bearing Arms ...." MacMaster et al, (cited in
note 38, at 333). For other examples, see id at 238, 266, 312, and Kenneth G. Hamilton,
John Ettwein and the Moravian Church During the Revolutionary Period 255, 265-66, 283-
86 (Times Pub Co, 1940).
54. For examples of such petitions, see MacMaster et al, (cited in note 38, at 157-59,
266-67, 332-34, 424-25). There is a possibility, however, that in some cases the failure of
the pacifists to make such a claim could have been due to their not wanting to antagonize
the patriots, some of whom had threatened to take the lives, houses, and property of the
pacifists. For examples of such acts, see id at 220.
55. Charles A. Lofgren, Compulsory Military Service Under the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 33 Wm &'Mary Quar 3rd ser 77-78 (1976); Leon Friedman, Con-
scription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 Mich L Rev 1505 (June
1969); and Arthur J. Alexander, Exemption from Military Service in the Old Dominion
during the War of the Revolution, 53 The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 155-
71 (July 1945). For an example of a provision granting exemptions to anyone, see the
provision from the Massachusetts constitution quoted above, in note 41.
56. McConnell is simply wrong when he writes, "Lest the exemptions be extended too
broadly, they [colonies and states] confined the exemptions to denominations or categories
known or proven to be 'conscientiously' opposed." The Origins and Original Understand-
ing. . ., (cited in note 25, at 1472).
57. For example, in the Constitution of New Hampshire, 1784, the provisions on lib-
erty of conscience are contained in sections IV and V, whereas the provision granting ex-
emptions from military service to conscientious objectors appears much later in section
XIII. See Sources of our Liberties, (cited in note 41, at 382-83).
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that the general principle of religious liberty was not thought to
include the right of exemption for religious conscientious objectors.
For these reasons, I conclude that the evidence is lacking to
support the proposition that late eighteenth-century Americans be-
lieved that the principle of religious liberty gave conscientious ob-
jectors to war a right to be exempt from conscription laws.
Although the historical record may support McConnell's claim that
"[miost of the colonies and states ... exempted religious objectors
from military conscription... expressly in order to avoid infringe-
ments of their religious conscience, 58 this does not mean that the
exemptions were thought to be rights or were required by the prin-
ciple of religious liberty. 59 Rather, what the record summarized
thus far indicates, at a minimum, is that most persons probably had
no opinion on the issue because exemptions from draft laws were
not discussed'very much in terms of religious liberty. This is the
conclusion reached by the foremost scholar on church-state rela-
tions in early America, Thomas J. Curry, who writes that the issue
of conscientious objection to war "never became the subject of
widespread dissent or discussion on Church-State matters" and,
thus, did not "contribute to the clarification of what Americans
meant by religious freedom.'
As important as it is, Curry's point can be called a "minimal"
one because it says only that the historical record does not demon-,
strate that early Americans believed that conscientious objectors
had a right to be exempt from conscription laws. It leaves open the
possibility that they did so believe. As such, it is not enough to
refute McConnell's main thesis that the right to religion-based ex-
emptions is at least a possible way of interpreting the free exercise
clause. Indeed, John Howard Yoder contends that the lack of de-
bate over the inclusion of conscientious objection as a religious lib-
erty right can better be explained on the grounds "that they
[framers] were taking them [exemptions] for granted, and were in-
tending to build a floor under them with the free exercise clause,
than to claim that the omission was intended to be read as a
denial. "61
58. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism.. ., (cited in note 27, at 1118).
59. Hamburger, (cited in note 24, at 929).
60. Church and State in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century America, 7 J Law & Relig
261, n 1 (1989).




I believe however, that it is possible to go beyond the weak
conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to establish that early
Americans believed that the principle of religious liberty guaran-
tees conscientious objectors a right to be exempt from obeying
conscription laws. In my view, the historical record warrants the
stronger conclusion that early Americans clearly and explicitly re-
jected such a position, for the record shows that in some places,
especially Pennsylvania, and at times, especially during and after
the Revolution, the religious liberty justification for exemptions as
constitutional rights was explicitly and repeatedly made by the pac-
ifists, but rejected by legislators and citizens in general.
The conclusion that there is insufficient evidence either way
about exemptions for conscientious objectors overlooks the fact
that the exemptions granted to conscientious objectors were sel-
dom, if ever, considered by them to be adequate or satisfactory
because they were limited or conditional in nature. To avoid mili-
tary service, the objectors had to secure a substitute or pay a fine
or special tax. It is quite clear, moreover, that the lawmakers who
imposed the fines or taxes considered them to be the equivalent to
military service, and their amount was set accordingly. 62 As a re-
sult, the exemptions were rejected by most Mennonites, Brethren,
and Quakers, some of whom suffered imprisonment and loss of
property for failure to serve, pay a fine/tax, or secure a substitute.63
Moreover, the lawmakers in the various states were quite aware
that pacifists objected to paying a fine or tax in lieu of military
service.64
62. Peter Brock, Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World
War 199-200 (Princeton University Press, 1968); R.R. Russell, Development of Conscien-
tious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 Geo Wash L Rev 414 (March 1952);
MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 62-63); and MacMaster, Land,
Piety, Peoplehood, (cited in note 44, at 256-57), Stephen M. Krohn, Jailed for Peace: The
History of American Draft Law Violators, 1658-1985 10 (1986), incorrectly says, "Four rev-
olutionary state governments proclaimed conscientious objection an absolute right in their
new constitutions."
63. MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 354-91, 523-25, 532).
Not surprisingly, therefore, during the First Congress when a proposed amendment to the
Constitution--one that would have granted exemptions from military service to pacifists-
was being discussed, Roger Sherman said, "It is well known that those who are religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, are equally scrupulous of getting substitutes or passing an
equivalent. Many of them would rather die than do either one or the other .... The Bill
of Rights: A Documentary History, Bernard Schwartz, ed, 2:1108 (Chelsea House Pub's,
1971).
64. MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 532).
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These facts make it very difficult, if not impossible, to main-
tain that the existence in early America of exemptions for consci-
entious objectors reflected a concern for religious liberty on the
part of legislators. If the exemptions were granted for that reason,
then it can only be concluded that the legislators had a very nig-
gardly conception of religious freedom. Certainly the pacifists who
sought the exemptions on the grounds of religious liberty did not
believe that the exemptions that were actually granted satisfied the
demands of religious liberty.65 To the contrary, in their minds the
laws granting conditional exemptions, especially those provisions
that were contained in the first state constitutions, constituted a
defeat, not a victory for religious liberty.66 The historical record, in
short, indicates not just uncertainty about but in some places actual
rejection of the idea that persons have, because of their religious
convictions, a right to be exempt from conscription laws.
To support this maximal conclusion in some detail, I will offer
an account of two cases where lawmakers explicitly considered but
rejected the proposition that religious liberty requires the govern-
ment to give exemptions from conscription laws to conscientious
objectors. The first case occurred in Pennsylvania, where there was
a large number of pacifists, most of whom contended for draft ex-
emptions on the basis of religious liberty and a specific provision in
the colonial charter. Although they never had to make such an
argument until 1757, because before then there was no possibility
of conscription laws being passed, thereafter when such laws were
passed and the pacifists needed to and did argue for exemptions
from the draft, they failed to obtain them because the people of
Pennsylvania rejected their understanding of religious freedom.
The second case involves the events at the First Congress, which in
1789 drafted a proposed Bill of Rights to be added to the new na-
tional Constitution, but which refused to include in that document
a provision giving conscientious objectors even a limited or condi-
tional right to be exempt from having to serve in the military.
65. See Jack D. Marietta, The Reformation of American Quakerism, 1748-1783 222-48
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984); J. William Frost, A Perfect Freedom: Religious
Liberty in Pennsylvania 66-69 (Cambridge University Press, 1990); and MacMaster et al,
Conscience in Crisis (cited in note 38, at 222-24, 532-35).
66. MacMaster, et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 222-24).
[Vol. 10
RELIGION-BASED EXEMPTIONS
II. TH- POLICY OF PACIFISM IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1757
Pennsylvania was founded by William Penn because, among
other reasons, he wanted a place where fellow Quakers could live
and not be punished, as they had been in England, for dissenting to
the established Church of England, refusing to serve in the mili-
tary, and refusing to swear oaths in court or oaths of allegiance to
the crown.6 7 Ironically, Penn failed to include in his 1682 Frame of
Government of Pennsylvania an explicit guarantee of a right to
religion-based exemptions from military service or oath taking. He
may have assumed that the Frame's guarantee of religious freedom
implied a military exemption right.68 We know that he often linked
liberty of conscience with the right to be exempt from militia duty
and the right to use affirmations rather than oaths.69 Another ex-
planation for the absence of provisions explicitly protecting consci-
entious objectors to war is that Penn assumed that because
Quakers would control the government in Pennsylvania, the colony
"would have no militia, no fortifications, and no war" and thus
would pose no threat to conscientious objectors. 70 That explana-
tion is made even more plausible by the fact that when the colonial
charter was revised in 1701, the religious liberty provision was ex-
panded to include a prohibition against compelling any persons "to
do or suffer any other Act or thing, contrary to their religious Per-
suasion." 71 Perhaps by 1701 Penn and his fellow Quakers began to
realize that Quakers would not always be in the majority in Penn-
sylvania and able to control its legislature72 and that the charter
needed to be more explicit in its protection of their pacifism and
refusal to swear oaths. In any case, the new religious liberty provi-
sion was worded so broadly that, taken literally, it guaranteed not
only a right to be exempt from military service and oath-taking but
a right to religion-based exemptions in general.
67. Sally Schwartz, William Penn and Toleration: Foundations of Colonial Penn-
sylvania, 50 Pennsylvania History, 291-95 (1983); and Frost, (cited in note 65, at 10-18).
68. The religious liberty provision stated that persons "shall, in no ways, be molested
or prejudiced for their religious persuasion, or practice, in matters of faith and worship, nor
shall they be compelled, at any time, to frequent or maintain any religious worship, place
or ministry whatever." Sources of Our Liberties, (cited in note 41, at 220).
69. Papers of William Penn, Richard S. Dunn and Mary M. Dunn, eds 4:321, 354-55,
392-93 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987).
70. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 17-18).
71. Sources of Our Liberties, (cited in note 41, at 256).
72. From approximately 1692 on, "the colony of Pennsylvania was no longer a Quaker
enclave, but contained a wide variety of religious persuasions who claimed the rights of
liberty of conscience." Frost, (cited in note 65, at 20).
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Whether that was what was intended is a matter of debate.
According to one scholar, the provision reflected "a sectarian vi-
sion," which sought to guarantee a religious liberty "that made it
possible for the nonresistant sects to live according to conscience
and not just to worship according to conscience. ' 73 On the other
hand, Penn himself had a very positive view of government and
emphasized strongly the importance of obedience to its laws.
Although he was an ardent proponent of liberty of conscience, he
clearly did not believe that it was an absolute freedom.
Very conservative in his conception of what was socially ac-
ceptable religious activity, Penn was willing to deny religious lib-
erty "to religious societies that were possibly inconsistent with the
safety of the civil government or whose presence was detrimental
to governmental authority. '74 He tended to separate conscience,
which he defined as "the Apprehension and Persuasion a Man has
of Duty to God," from behavior. 75 A typical passage that illus-
trates his position is the following: "We are pleading only for such a
Liberty of Conscience, as preserves the Nation in Peace, Trade, and
Commerce; and would not exempt any Man, or Party of Men, from
not keeping those excellent Laws, that tend to Sober, Just and In-
dustrious Living."76 Moreover, his conception of what morality re-
quires or forbids that could be enforced by law was remarkably
broad (and very likely to offend a modern reader). 77 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that even McConnell concedes that passages in
Penn's writings "can be interpreted as rejecting free exercise
exemptions. "78
Complicating matters even more, the legal status of the new
religious liberty provision was soon cast in doubt by the action of
73. MacMaster et al, 27 Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 27) (emphasis in
original).
74. Melvin B. Endy, Jr., William Penn and Early Quakerism 325-26 (Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1973).
75. Quoted in Sally Schwartz, "A Mixed Multitude": The Struggle for Toleration in
Colonial Pennsylvania 17 (New York University Press, 1987).
76. Quoted in McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding..., (cited in note
25, at 1447-48). Penn also said, "I always premise this Conscience to keep within the
Bounds of Morality, and that it be neither Frantick nor Mischievous, but a Good Subject, a
Good Child, a Good Servant, in all the Affairs of Life." Quoted in Schwartz, A Mixed
Multitude, (cited in note 75, at 17) (emphasis in original). Also, see A Collection of the
Works of William Penn, comp Henry Portsmouth 2:687, 719-22. 810 (AMS Press, 1974 rep
of 1726 edition).
77. See his "Frame of Government of Pennsylvania" (1682), in Sources of Our Liber-
ties, (cited in note 41, at 218-20).
78. Free Exercise Revisionism ... , (cited in note 27, at 1117).
[Vol. 10
RELIGION-BASED EXEMPTIONS
the Board of Trade back in London. In exercising its right to re-
view all of the colony's laws, it refused to approve the law, partially
on the grounds that it did not place any limits on the "conscien-
tious practices" that it allowed. As a result, the colonial Council in
1724 declared the religious liberty part of the original 1682 Frame
of Government still in effect. 9 Until a new constitution was
adopted in 1776, however, many Pennsylvanians, especially the
Quakers, continued to look upon the religious liberty section of the
1701 Charter of Privileges as valid and as the legal basis of their
claims to be exempt from military service. Others, however,
whether they accepted the validity of the 1701 provision or not,
challenged the Quaker interpretation of the provision and the prin-
ciple of religious liberty. 0
In order to understand the debate that occurred in Penn-
sylvania over the meaning of religious freedom, one must first un-
derstand the basic dilemma that William Penn and the Quakers
faced from the very beginning of the colony's existence because
they were in control of the its assembly: how they could protect
the lives and liberties of all the citizens without compromising their
commitment to the practice of pacifism a.8  In the face of this di-
lemma, the Quaker-controlled Assembly repeatedly decided
against passing military or defense measures in the hopes that the
Indians could be pacified by fair and humane treatment, that Brit-
ish forces would protect the colony from foreign invaders, and ulti-
mately that God would preserve the colony. 2 Although on a few
occasions it raised money for British military expeditions, 3 before
1777 Pennsylvania successfully managed to avoid having a militia
law that required compulsory military duty.84 As a result, the mat-
ter of exemptions from military service for conscientious objectors
never became a pressing issue; the Quakers protected consciences
by refusing to pass militia laws.
There were times, however, when the colony faced serious ex-
ternal threats and when many citizens urged the assembly to estab-
lish a militia to protect their lives and property. Because the
79. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 21-22, and 170, n 48).
80. For the general outlines of the debate, see id, at 29-43.
81. MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 28-31).
82. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 34-35).
83. Id, 36, 38.
84. MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, 61-83, 165-74, 213-25. The Assembly actu-
ally passed a compulsory militia law in 1757, but it was vetoed by the governor. See below,
notes 96-98, and accompanying text.
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assembly refused to do so until 1755, it was often criticized, among
other things, for violating the liberty of conscience of those who
felt that defense measures were needed.85 To these critics, the re-
fusal of the Quakers, because of their religious scruples, to govern
Pennsylvania according to widely accepted principles and like most
states and colonies were governed was an example of one group's
imposition of its religion onto the rest of the citizenry and a viola-
tion of Penn's guarantee of religious freedom.86
It might be argued that the Quakers could have avoided this
criticism as well as any violation of their consciences simply by
passing a compulsory militia law with an unconditional exemption
for themselves and other conscientious objectors. They never did
so. Aside from the fact that voting for such a measure would have
been unconscionable to them, they believed that selective compul-
sory service would have been unfair to non-pacifists and a violation
of their religious liberty. As early as 1739, when the governor
urged the assembly to enact a militia law, the Quaker-dominated
assembly admitted that it was faced with a dilemma. On the one
hand, passing such a law without granting exemptions to pacifists
would violate the constitutional guarantee of liberty of conscience,
but, on the other hand, passing a militia law and exempting only
pacifists "would be an Inconsistency with themselves, and partial
with respect to others."87 The assembly may have also thought it
had no authority to grant such exemptions. 88 In any case, the as-
sembly passed no militia law at all-at least not until 1755.
The militia law passed in that year, however, was most unu-
sual; it authorized a militia and set up rules for its organization, but
enrollment in the militia was not required of anyone. The law basi-
cally legalized a voluntary militia89 and was designed to avoid the
dilemma of having no militia or having one that drafted only non-
85. For all the arguments of the anti-pacifists, see Frost, (cited in note 65, at 36-38).
86. Hermann Wellenreuther, The Political Dilemma of the Quakers in Pennsylvania,
1681-1748, 94 Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 140-47 (April 1970), and
Frost, (cited in note 65, at 30, 36).
87. Quoted in Schwartz, A Mixed Multitude, (cited in note 75, at 166, and 164-66).
88. It is somewhat surprising to read that in or shortly before 1742, the Mennonites,
because they realized that "there is no guarantee that if a hostile attack should strike this
province, we would not.., be compelled against our conscience to take up arms and meet
the foe with weapons," petitioned the Pennsylvania Assembly for a law exempting them
from compulsory military service, but were met with the reply "that such matter is entirely
beyond its authority." Quoted in MacMaster, Land, Piety, Peoplehood, (cited in note 44, at
231).
89. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 38-39), and MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited
in note 38, at 76).
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pacifists. This is clear from the language of the law itself. First, it
said that any law that compelled Quakers to bear arms would vio-
late the Charter of Privileges, but that exempting only Quakers
from military service "would be inconsistent and Partial." Then, it
noted that "great Numbers of People of other Religious Denomi-
nations are come among us who are under no such Restraint, some
of whom... Conscientiously think it their Duty to fight in defence
of their Country.. ., and such have an Equal Right to Liberty of
Conscience with others." Therefore, the statute concluded, "We
do not think it reasonable that any should thro' a want of legal
powers be in the least restrain'd from doing what they Judge it
their Duty to do for their own Security and the publick Good
"790
Although it was declared invalid by the authorities in London,
the law of 1755 illustrates that at that time the principle of religious
liberty, as it was understood by the Quakers, was difficult for them
to apply in a meaningful way because of its apparent inconsistency.
In an essay explaining and defending the Militia Act of 1755, Ben-
jamin Franklin, who was by then one of the leading spokesmen for
the Quaker Party (although not a Quaker himself), made the diffi-
culty quite clear. In defense of the law's failure either to compel
the Quakers to muster or to pay a fine if they did not, he argued
that they were exempted from both by the religious liberty provi-
sion in the 1701 Charter, which he quoted. Then he explained why
the Quakers, "being a Majority in the Assembly," had not "made
the Law compulsory on others." "But it seems they thought it
more equitable and generous to leave to all as much Liberty as
they enjoy themselves, and not lay even a seeming Hardship on
others, which they themselves declined to bear." Moreover, in de-
fense of the pacifists, he added, "When Taxes are raised ... for the
King's Service, the Quakers and Menonists pay their Part of them
.... And out of these Taxes those Men are paid who go into actual
Service. 91 Franklin's comments clearly suggest that the Quakers
and their pacifist allies, when they were citing and relying on reli-
gious liberty as the reason for their decision to have a voluntary
militia, were uncomfortable with the notion that religious liberty
90. Quoted in MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 115-16).
Also, see Schwartz, A Mixed Multitude, (cited in note 75, at 213).
91. A Dialogue between X, Y, and Z (1755), The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Leo-
nard W. Labaree, ed, 6:301-03 (Yale University Press, 1963).
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gave them the right to be excused from having to do what others
were required to do.
III. THE FAILURE OF PACIFISTS IN PENNSYLVANIA TO OBTAIN
EXEMPTIONS, 1755-1790
Between 1755 and the beginning of the American Revolution,,
the Quakers lost control of the Pennsylvania assembly-for at least
three reasons. First, there were demographic changes. By 1760, all
the pacifist groups together composed not more than twenty-five
percent of the colony's population. Second, "[t]he events of the
turbulent years from 1740 to 1770 created new ethnic and religious
alliances which made the pacifists into a decided minority with few
allies." 92 Most of these events were political and military threats of
one kind or another that caused more and more of Pennsylvania's
citizens, especially those living in the frontier part of the state, to
reject the Quaker's traditional policy of government pacifism. 93
Then, when war with England began to appear inevitable, Quaker
pacifism was thought to be not o'ly irrelevant but even threatening
to the patriot cause.94
Finally, as these developments occurred, the Quakers and
other pacifist groups experienced an internal "revival" of commit-
ment to the principles of nonresistance and nonviolence. Members
of the sects who advocated and practiced compromise of these
principles for the sake of worldly comfort and gain were chastised
and, in some cases, forced out of their churches. As a result, most
Quaker politicians felt that they could no longer serve in the as-
sembly or hold other offices in the government, because it was on
the verge of adopting and carrying out a policy of war.95
Once they lost their political power and then were faced with
the prospects of having to fight in a war, the Quakers and other
pacifists became more insistent and unified in claiming that the
principle of liberty of conscience, especially as embodied in the
1701 Charter of Privileges, gave them the right to be exempt from
both serving in the military and paying a fine or tax instead.96 They
urgently made the argument in 1757, when for the first time the
92. MacMaster, Land, Piety, Peoplehood, (cited in note 44, at 247).
93. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 38-43).
94. Id at 60-73.
95. Id at 39, 66, and MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 213-19,
523-30).
96. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 34-35).
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Assembly passed a compulsory militia law, partially because
Quakers no longer constituted a majority of the body. Although
the militia law offered conscientious objectors the alternative of
noncombatant service, it also imposed a fine of twenty shillings on
those who refused to serve either in the military or in a noncomba-
tant way. This caused the Philadelphia Meeting for Suffering to
protest the law as a'violation of the religious liberty guaranteed
Quakers by the colony's Charter. Members of the opposing party,
of course, argued that unconditional exemptions for conscientious
objectors were unfair.97 Ironically, but fortunately for the
Quakers, the law was vetoed by the governor because he thought
the law went too far in granting protection to pacifists.98
The issue of exemptions became much more pressing when it
appeared that the colonies would fight a war to obtain indepen-
dence from England. On the one hand, because of their commit-
ment to nonresistance and passive obedience, the pacifists
attempted to take a neutral position on the impeding conflict. On
the other hand, by 1775, voluntary associations Of patriots (As-
sociators) had begun organizing aind enrolling persons in local mili-
tias. When members of the pacifist sects refused to enroll, .clamor
began for imposing a fine or tax on them that would be the
equivalent for turning out with the militia. Its purpose was to com-
pel the pacifists to take their place beside their neighbors in de-
fence of their liberties and to no longer be "on the sidelines" in the
struggle.99
The issue came to a head late in 1775, when it appeared that a
compulsory militia law would become a reality. Petitions from
both the Associators (asking for a law requiring all persons to sup-
port the patriot cause either in person or in money) and the Non-
Associators (asking that exemptions from both service and contri-
butions be granted to conscientious objectors) were submitted to
the Pennsylvania Assembly.1°° The Philadelphia Meeting for Suf-
fering appealed to the Assembly for unconditional exemptions
from military duty on the grounds that the "liberty of conscience"
guaranteed in the colony's Charter "was not limited to the Acts of
97. In a sermon on "Love of Country," the Presbyterian minister, Francis Alison, said,
"All ... should have free use of their religion, but so as not on that score to burden or
oppress others." Quoted in id at 51.
98. Id at 39, and MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 78, 117-20).
99. Richard K. MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory: The Peace Churches in the Ameri-
can Revolution, 9 Fides et Historia 8 (1977).
100. Id at 15-17.
3671
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
Public Worship only."''1 The group also contended that the As-
sembly's failure to protect their consciences was inconsistent with
the main reason that William Penn had established the colony in
the first place.102 Similar petitions were submitted to local authori-
ties. One of them, from a group of conscientious objectors in
Berks County protesting the County Committee's decision to im-
pose a fine on all those who refused to bear arms, is noteworthy
because it referred to the right not to bear arms as "a divine and
Sacred Right" and concluded that "to wrest the Enjoyment of the
Same from any Body must be Sacrilege' [and e]xcite divine Ven-
geance, and must be void in Effect.' 0 3
Although the Quakers and other pacifists made a good legal
case on behalf of their having a constitutional right to be exempt
from military service, other Pennsylvanians, especially the As-
sociators, did not accept the Quakers' interpretation of the 1701
Charter of Privileges. Different groups made different arguments.
In 1775, in a "representation" to the Assembly that asked for a tax
or fine on non-Associators that Would be equivalent to the burden
borne by them, a group of Associators from Philadelphia ad-
dressed head on the claims of the'Quakers that the Charter of 1701
gave them a right to be unconditionally exempt from militia duty.
First, the group appealed to "the most certain and evident Princi-
ples of Equity and Justice" and argued that any "Religion which
teaches to deny the Demand of Justice and Equity, cannot be of
God; nor will the Conscience which is influenced thereby meet
with his Approbation.'1 4 This appeal to justice, ironically, had
been used earlier by the pacifists themselves, when they had con-
trolled the government, to justify their policy of having no militia
(instead of having one and exempting conscientious objectors from
having to serve in it). 0 5
Second, although the Associators admitted that "Liberty of
Conscience is so sacred a Thing that it ought ever to be preserved
inviolate," they contended that "the great Law of Self-preservation
is equally binding with the Letter of written Charters .... ." There-
101. Marietta (cited in note 65, at 226) and Brock, (cited in note 62, at 199, fn 32). For
the wording of another petition that appealed to the "liberty of conscience" guaranteed in
Penn's Charter, see R. MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory (cited in note 99, at 16).
102. Marietta, (cited in note 65, at 226).
103. Quoted in MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 257. See 256-
58 for account of what transpired).
104. Quoted in id at 263.
105. See above, notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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fore, they concluded that "when, under Pretence of this Liberty the
very Existence of Civil Government is struck at,... either the Lib-
erty claimed must be given up or the Government dissolved; and
this we apprehend to be the Case when any of the Members of a
Community, from a Claim of Religious Liberty, refuse to support
the Society to which they belong. . .. ",06
Finally, the Associators said that the Charter provision on
which the Quakers relied was "never intended to grant an Exemp-
tion from paying their just Proportion towards the Support of...
[government], whether Civil or Military .... " They insisted that
the religious liberty provision did not "extend to such Exemptions
on any Pretence whatever" but, in fact, required those who claimed
the liberty "to 'profess themselves obliged to live quietly under the
civil Government,' which cannot possibly be when they refuse to
support the Measures often necessary to its very Existence." To
support this conclusion, they pointed out that exemptions from
paying taxes to support a war were inconsistent with the colony's
royal charter, which gave the proprietors the power "to levy, mus-
ter and train all Sorts of Men, of what Condition soever... and to
make War [etc.] .... ." To drive the point home, the petition closed
with the argument that no claim of exemptions from having to sup-
port military measures had ever been granted Quakers "in any part
of the British Empire" and that, in fact, the Quakers had always
paid taxes "levied for the Purpose of defraying the Expences of
Military Expeditions, both here and in Europe" and had never
complained about doing so. "Thus," the petition ended, "their own
Practice becomes a strong Proof against them . .. .",07
Although this petition did not explicitly deny that the charter
provision created a general right to religion-based exemptions and,
thus, might be explained on the grounds that its authors thought
that the Quakers' claim was too extreme (or, in today's parlance,
should be denied because of a "compelling" governmental inter-
est), the same cannot be said about another petition submitted to
106. Quoted in MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 263-264).
107. Id at 264-65. The group also argued that the exemption provision in the Charter
was null and void because "William Penn had no Right... to grant Privileges further than
was granted to him by the Royal Charter, and ... the Royal Prerogative of the King of
Great-Britain does not comprehend any Right... to grant any Exemption from supporting
the Constitution and Government to any Man or Set of Men, on any Pretence whatever...
and therefore [such a power] could never be granted by the King to the Worthy Proprietor
who granted the Charter of Privileges." Id at 264.
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the Assembly (by the officers of the Military Association of the
City and Liberties of Philadelphia). It said:
We cannot alter the Opinion we have ever held with Regard to
those parts of the Charter quoted by the Addressors, that they
relate only to an Exemption from any Acts of Uniformity in
Worship, and from paying towards the Support of other reli-
gious Establishments, than those to which the Inhabitants of this
Province respectively belong. We know of no Distinctions of
Sects, when we meet our Fellow Citizens on Matters of Public
Concern, and ask those conscientiously scrupulous against bear-
ing Arms, to contribute toward the Experience of our Opposi-
tion, not because of their religious Persuasion, but because the
general Defence of the Province demands it.' °8
In essence, the petition "narrowly construed the grant of religious
freedom in the Charter and threw the sectarian contention that
religion was more than a Sunday worship out of court." 10 9 To sup-
port their contention the Associators stated that the Charter provi-
sion had never been understood, even by Quakers, to guarantee an
exemption from paying taxes iiisupport of wars.110
Regardless of its historical merit, it was this second and nar-
row interpretation of religious liberty that eventually won out in
the political arena-in at least three significant ways. First, the
Constitution adopted in 1776 by the newly independent state of
Pennsylvania constituted a clear defeat for the pacifists. Not only
did it make the 1701 Charter irrelevant but more importantly, its
rewritten provision on religious liberty contained no clause imply-
ing a right to religion-based exemptions. Specifically omitted was
the clause from the 1701 Charter that prohibited the compelling of
persons "to do or suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary to their
religious Persuasion," and the new clause guaranteeing the free ex-
ercise of religion was explicitly limited to worship."'
108. Quoted in MacMaster, "Neither Whig Nor Tory," (cited in note 99, at 17).
109. Id.
110. Marietta, (cited in note 65, at 226).
'111. The entire provision reads as follows:."That all men have a natural and unalienable
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious
worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or
against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any man,.who acknowledges the being of
God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his reli-
gious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that no authority can or ought
to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or
in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship."
Constitution of Pennsylvania (1776), in Sources of Our Liberties, (cited in note 41, at 329).
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In addition, although the Constitution contained a clause ex-
empting conscientious objectors from having to bear arms, it was
not part of the religious liberty provision, and, more importantly,
the exemption that it guaranteed was conditioned on persons' pay-
ing an "equivalent" to serving in the military." 2 In short, the new
Constitution did not provide the pacifists with the protection to
which they thought they were entitled by the principle of religious
liberty.113
Second, both in 1775, when the 1701 Charter was still in effect,
and afterward the Pennsylvania Assembly passed and repassed
conscription laws that exempted "nonassociators," but only if they
paid a special tax." 4 "The Assembly clearly intended to make the
peace churches pay the cost of the war and the tax on Non-As-
sociators was an avowed equivalent to military service."" 5 More-
over, the laws were harshly, although not uniformly, enforced with
the result being that many pacifists suffered greatly for refusing to
serve in the military or pay the s 'ecial tax. The punishments they
received included large fines, loss of property, imprisonment, exile,
forcible conscription, and loss of certain civil rights, such as the
right to vote." 6 Although some pacifists asserted that the conscrip-
tion law violated the religious liberty provision in the new 1776
constitution," 7 it is noteworthy that one of the most eloquently
worded petitions to the Pennsylvania Assembly appealed not to
that provision but to "the generous and liberal foundation of the
charter and laws agreed upon in England between our first worthy
proprietary William Penn and our ancestors, whereby they appre-
hended religious and civil liberty would be secured inviolate to
themselves and their posterity" and to "the true spirit of govern-
ment... [and] the real interest and good of the community....,,118
All their protests, however, were to no avail. The general meaning
of what happened has been concisely stated by J. William Frost:
112. Id at 330. See MacMaster, et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 224).
113. Frost, (cited in note 65 at 65).
114. Marietta, (cited in note 65, at 227); MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in
note 38, at 222-23, 282-84); and Frost, (cited in note 65, at 62-63, 67).
115. MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, 223. The same kind of law for the same sort
of reason was also passed by the states of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. Idat
224-25, 331-32.
116. Id at 293, 523, 529, and Hamilton, (cited in note 53, at 225-317).
117. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 68).
118. A 1778 petition from the Quaker Meeting for Sufferings for Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, quoted in MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 438).
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"The Revolution marked the end of the Quaker or sectarian defini-
tion of religious liberty."119
Moreover, what happened in Pennsylvania regarding the
meaning of religious liberty was not unique. According to a recent
study, "Americans were in general agreement that government
could lawfully require citizens to perform some manner of military
service, sometimes with allowance for alternative service or, more
commonly, monetary payments. The doctrine of the Pennsylvania
Bill of Rights of 1776 that made the right to claim the protection of
society in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property dependent on
personal military service, or an equivalent, had not only gained
wide acceptance during the war years, but found a place in nearly
every state constitution adopted in wartime.' 120
Even so, after the Revolutionary War ended, the issue of
whether religious conscientious objectors, like Quakers, had a right
to be exempt from serving in the military did not die. In Penn-
sylvania, the issue continued to be debated until 1790, when the
state adopted a new constitution. At the convention that drafted
the document, an attempt was made to repeal the requirement
stated in the 1776 constitution that conscientious objectors had to
pay a special tax in lieu of military service, but the proposed revi-
sion was defeated by a large margin. By doing so, "the convention
continued to repudiate the Quaker-sectarian definition of religious
liberty.' 2' Moreover, the Quakers themselves understood what
was happening as "confining the rights of conscience to what they
call worship."' 22 Finally, because many of those involved in the
drafting of the 1790 constitution were also involved in the drafting
and/or ratification of the Bill of Rights, what happened at the state
constitutional convention provides a valuable, albeit indirect indi-
cation of how Pennsylvanians understood the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment."2
119. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 72) (emphasis added).
120. MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis, (cited in note 38, at 531).
121. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 75).
122. Warner Mifflin, "Letter to Henry Drinker" (June 27, 1792), in Life and Ancestry of
Warner Mifflin, comp Hilda Justice 105 (Ferris & Leach, 1905).
123. Frost, (cited in note 65, at 74).
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IV. THE ISSUE OF EXEMPTIONS AND THE FRAMING OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS
Exemptions from military service for conscientious objectors
became a national issue first when ratification of our present Con-
stitution was debated and then later when the First Congress de-
bated what provisions to include in a bill of rights. Here again,
however, the evidence indicates that most persons at that time did
not think that the principle of religious liberty or the free exercise
of religion guarantees a right to religion-based exemptions in gen-
eral or to exemptions from military service.
The exemption issue surfaced when Antifederalists opposed to
the proposed constitution argued that the document was defective
because it did not contain a bill of rights, including a provision giv-
ing religious conscientious objectors a right to be exempt from hav-
ing to bear arms.124 In order to get around this objection and get
the Constitution ratified, its proponents promised to add a bill of
rights. In turn, various states drew up lists of provisions to be in-
cluded in a bill of rights.
Three states, Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, pro-
posed a provision to protect conscientious objectors. 25 Then,
when the First Congress met, James Madison, who had promised to
work for the addition of a bill of rights and was a member of the
House of Representatives committee charged with writing it, in-
cluded a conscientious objector provision in a list of rights that he
drafted for the House to consider. The provision stated that "no
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to
render military service in person."'1 26
124. For example, the minority report issued by the Antifederalists at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention included this passage: "Secondly, the rights of conscience may be vio-
lated as there is no exemption of those persons who are conscientiously scrupulous of bear-
ing arms .... the framers of our State Constitution made the most express and decided
declaration and stipulations in favor of the rights of conscience; but now, when no necessity
exists, those dearest rights of men are left insecure." Quoted in John B. McMaster and
Frederick D. Stone, eds, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788 (480-81) (Da
Capo Press, 1970 rep of 1888 ed).
125. All three proposals were identically worded as follows: "That any person relig-
iously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to
employ another to bear arms in his stead." The Debates in the Several State Conventions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution . . ., Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3:659. 4:244, and 1:335
(Burt Franklin, 1965 rep of 1888 ed, 5 vols).
126. 1 Annals of Cong 434 (1789) [1789-18241. Although the wording of Madison's
proposal is somewhat different from that of the proposal submitted by the states, the differ-
ence is of no significance with respect to the issue at hand. Madison twice promised to
submit a bill of rights-first, in order to get the Virginia ratifying convention to vote for
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Like its antecedents in the various state constitutions,
Madison's proposition was hardly radical, for it allowed the gov-
ernment to condition an exemption on the paying of a fine or the
hiring of a substitute-neither of which was acceptable to most
pacifists.127 After the provision was reviewed by a special commit-
tee, however, it returned in a more radical form, i.e., without any
conditions attached to the exemption. It was this radical proposal
that was extensively debated by the House of Representatives in
1789. Eventually, however, it was rejected in favor of one like
Madison had originally proposed, but even this mild provision
never became part of the Bill of Rights because it was removed
by the Senate from the list of proposed amendments to the
Constitution. 12
8
What does this record of events at the First Congress tell us
about what late eighteenth-century Americans believed regarding
their having a natural or constitutional right to be exempt from
having to bear arms? First, and obviously, it tells us that a signifi-
cant number of them did not believe that they had any such a right;
after all, the proposed conscientious objector amendment was re-
jected by the Congress. 29 Moreover, although those who voted
against the proposed amendment had different reasons for doing
so, many of them who did so must have agreed with the reasons
given by Representative Egbert Benson:
[I] ... would always leave it to the benevolence of the Legisla-
ture, for, modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express
it in such a manner as to clear it from ambiguity. No man can
claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious persuasion,
but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the
the proposed constitution and, second, in order to get himself elected as a member of the
first Congress. See Papers of James Madison, 11:297, and Miller, (cited in note 21, at 119-
21). As to why he included a CO provision in his proposed bill of rights, he may have done
so because he personally favored such a provision or simply because it was among the
provisions included in the list submitted by his own state of Virginia. There is, however,
nothing in the record to support McConnell's claim that Madison's action was the result of
his belief that freedom of religion required exemptions from generally applicable laws "in
some circumstances." McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ... (cited in
note 25, at 1454). On this point, see Hamburger, (cited in note 24, at 927).
127. See above, notes 12-64 and accompanying text.
128. See House of Representatives Debates, July-August, 1789, in The Bill of Rights,
(cited in note 63, at 2:1107-09, 1126-27); Renner, (cited in note 39, at 142-43); Arlin M.
Adams and Charles J. Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty 63-64 (Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); and Berns, (cited in note 24, at 54-55). McConnell erro-
neously says that the more radical version was approved by the House. The Origins and
Historical Understanding. . ., (cited in note 25, at 1500).
129. M. Malbin, (cited in note 24, at 39-40, fn 4).
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discretion of the Government. If this stands part of the Consti-
tution, it will be a question before the Judiciary on every regula-
tion you make with respect to the organization of this militia,
whether it comports with his declaration or not. It is extremely
injudicious to intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals. I
have no reason to believe but that the Legislature will always
possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a
matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left to their
discretion. 30
Second, the record tells us that even most of those members of
the First Congress who believed that persons have a natural or con-
stitutional right to exemptions from military service did not believe
that the right is unconditional or complete in nature, for a provi-
sion granting an unconditional exemption was rejected by the
House of Representatives. This, in turn, means that even if it were
conceded that the exemptions for conscientious objectors that ex-
isted in early America stand as a model for or justification of a
broader right to religion-based exemptions in general, it must also
be admitted that the kind of right to religion-based exemptions
that they exemplify or justify is a very weak or limited right. In-
deed, one could argue, as most pacifists at that time did, that it is
no right at all because persons have to compensate heavily for the
exemptions they receive.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the attempt to include a
separate conscientious objector provision in the bill of rights
clearly implies that even those who favored such a provision did
not believe that a right to be exempt from bearing arms is required
by the principle of religious freedom. Otherwise, why would they
have felt it necessary to have a separate conscientious objector pro-
vision when it was clear that the Bill of Rights was going to include
a provision guaranteeing the free exercise of religion? Madison,
for example, submitted a conscientious objector amendment even
though the amendment he proposed at the same time to protect
religious freedom was worded perhaps as broadly as it possibly
could have been: "[Nior shall the full and equal rights of con-
science be in any manner, nor on any pretext infringed.' 131 The
most likely explanation for his doing so is that Madison did not
130. The Bill of Rights, (cited in note 63, at 2:110). Chester J. Antieau says that Ben-
son's views were "more representative of his age" than were the views of those who
thought that persons had a right to be free of military service. Rights of Our Fathers 53-54
(Coiner Pub's Ltd, 1968).
131. 1 Annals of Congress 434 (1789).
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intend for his religious liberty proposal, as broad as it was, to give
conscientious objectors a right to be exempt from bearing arms. 132
Although Michael McConnell recognizes the import of this
last argument, he again characteristically refuses to concede the
point; instead he gives three possible reasons why a separate provi-
sion for conscientious objectors would have been required even if
it had. been thought that they were also protected by the free exer-
cise clause. None of the three, however, is persuasive.
First, McConnell says that the free exercise clause would not
have protected pacifists from state militia laws because when it was
adopted it applied only to the federal government. 33 This argu-
ment will not work for two reasons. One, it assumes that the pro-
posed separate provision exempting persons with religious scruples
from bearing arms would have applied to the states, whereas, in
fact, Madison's proposal was intended to limit only the national
government. 4 Two, if McConnell is correct in arguing that the
religious liberty provisions in the state constitutions guaranteed a
right to religion-based exemptions, including exemptions from
draft laws, then there was no reason to have a national constitu-
tional provision that applied to the states. On the other hand, if
such a provision was necessary to protect pacifists from state mili-
tia laws, that means the state religious liberty provisions were not
meant to guarantee exemptions from conscription laws to consci-
entious objectors.
Second, McConnell argues that although the free exercise
clause was intended to guarantee a general right to religion-based
exemptions, its framers could not be sure that the courts would
uphold that it protected the specific right of conscientious objectors
to be exempt from conscription laws; after all, that determination
would "depend, in part, on the judiciary's assessment of the gov-
ernment interest in conscription." To be on the safe side, there-
fore, those who favored protecting the pacifists thought a separate
provision just for them was needed. 35 This, of course, makes
132. Nevertheless, as early as 1795, at least one Quaker was arguing that the free exer-
cise clause of the First Amendment guarantees to religious conscientious objectors a right
not to bear arms. "A Letter from One of the Society of Friends relative to the Conscien-
tious Scrupulousness of its Members to Bear Arms, 1795," In Conscience in America: A
Documentary History of Conscientious Objections in America, 1757-1967, Lillian Schlissel,
ed, 49-54 (E. P. Dutton, 1968).
133. The Origins and Historical Understanding..., (cited in note 25, at 1501).
134. Lofgren (cited in note 55, at 83).
135. The Origins and Historical Understanding. .. , (cited in note 25, at 1501).
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sense, but it undercuts McConnell's main argument that early
Americans believed that exemptions for pacifists are dictated by
the principle of religious liberty, because doubt about what the
courts would do implies doubt about whether early Americans be-
lieved that pacifists should be protected by the free exercise clause.
Third, McConnell contends that because some states had pro-
posed that both an exemption provision and a religious liberty pro-
vision be added to the Constitution, even those Congressmen who
thought that conscientious objectors were protected by the free ex-
ercise clause would have thought it necessary to keep a separate
provision specifically for them, for if it were not kept, "this would,
create an inference that there is an intention in the general govern-
ment to compel all its citizens to bear arms"-an inference that
would undercut the protection that the free exercise clause ostensi-
bly was intended to afford the pacifists.136 Again, although this was
a possibility, the main effect of this argument is simply to raise a
question about why the states submitted two separate provisions to
the First Congress-one dealing with religious liberty and the
other dealing with exemptions for conscientious objections-and
why even before that they had separate provisions in their own
constitutions? It seems only reasonable to assume that they did so
because they did not believe that (or at least had serious doubts
about whether) the principle of religious liberty entails a right to be
exempt from serving in the military.
In short, events before and during the First Congress' discus-
sion of the issue lead inexorably to the conclusion that the framers
of the Bill of Rights did not think that the principle of religious
liberty entailed a right on the part of conscientious objectors to be
exempt from serving in the military-although they did believe
that legislatures could grant such exemptions as expressions of
compassion. What happened has been well summarized as follows:
The lawmakers were reluctant to appear in the role of religious
persecutors.... But they were firmly of the opinion that mili-
tary service was an obligation of every citizen. If some citizens
could not fulfil their military obligation because they saw partic-
ipation in war as inconsistent with the teachings of Jesus, their
protest could be dismissed as no more than "a religious persua-
sion." The argument for freedom of conscience that the nonre-
sistant sects had presented again and again for more than 50
years was inadmissible. No man had a natural right to live by his
136. Id.
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conscience. The best he could hope for would be that govern-
ment would be disposed to tolerate his peculiar opinions. It was
a far cry from the liberty of conscience the peaceable sects had
enjoyed under William Penn's Charter.137
V. CONCLUSION
Given the facts and arguments presented above, it is no won-
der that the Supreme Court has consistently stated, albeit in dicta,
that the First Amendment does not give religious conscientious ob-
jectors a right to be exempt from bearing arms.138 The historical
evidence to support a contrary holding simply does not exist. As
Chester Antieau has' written, "It cannot be affirmed from the
materials now extant that the majority of the Founding Fathers of
the Revolutionary generation accepted as of natural right the claim
of conscientious objectors to be free from military service. '139
This, however, is the minimal conclusion that can be drawn from
the evidence presented in this paper.
The preceding account of what happened in Pennsylvania sup-
ports a much stronger conclusion, for the citizens of that state con-
fronted directly and explicitly the question of whether religious
liberty gives persons a right to be exempt from having to obey con-
scription laws. They decided that it does not. The same judgment
was reached by the framers of the Bill of Rights. The inescapable
conclusion is that at least these two groups-the majority of Penn-
sylvanians and the majority of the members of the First Congress-
rejected the idea that religious liberty or the free exercise of reli-
gion gives conscientious objectors a right to be excused from serv-
ing in the military. It is not surprising, therefore, that even Donald
Giannella, who believes that the free exercise clause was intended
to create a general right to religion-based exemptions, admits that
denial of special treatment to conscientious objectors probably ac-
cords "with the views of the founding fathers.'14°
What happened in Pennsylvania, however, leads to an even
more far-reaching conclusion, for in debating whether religious lib-
erty gives pacifists a right to be exempt from conscription, Penn-
137. MacMaster et al, Conscience in Crisis (cited in note 38, at 534-35).
138. See Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 US 11, 29 (1905). Arver v United States, 245 US
366 (1918); United States v Macintosh, 283 US 605, 623-25 (1931); Hamilton v Regents of the
University of California, 293 US 245 (1934); In re Summers, 325 US 561 (1945); Dickinson v
United States, 325 US 561 (1945); and Johnson v Robison, 415 US 361, 375, n 14 (1974).
139. Antieau, (cited in note 130, at 53).
140. Giannella, (cited in note 19, at 1411-12).
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sylvanians were forced to debate the general meaning of religious
liberty. After all, their colonial charter had a provision designed to
protect religious liberty, and in 1776 they adopted a new constitu-
tion with a new religious liberty provision.141 In considering the
issue of exemptions for conscientious objectors, therefore, Penn-
sylvanians could not help but discuss the meaning of those provi-
sions and of religious freedom in general, and they interpreted
them narrowly as guaranteeing only a right to be. free from laws
interfering in religious belief and worship. In short, Pennsylvani-
ans rejected the idea that religious liberty entails a general right to
religion-based exemptions. Given the fact that "Pennsylvania was,
by all accounts, among the two or three most liberal colonies (and
later, states) on the subject of religious liberty,"'142 the significance
of this conclusion can hardly be overstated.
In conclusion, this paper has shown that to the extent that crit-
icism of the Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Smith is based
on the assumption that the free exercise clause was originally in-
tended to guarantee a right to religion-based exemptions and to
the extent that that assumption is based on the fact that in early
America exemptions from conscription laws were given to consci-
entious objectors, such criticism is misplaced. The mere existence
of the exemptions themselves proves nothing, one way or another.
More specifically, it cannot be assumed that the exemptions were
thought to be rights or that they were given because of the princi-
ple of religious liberty. To the contrary, the historical record
clearly shows that when the issue was debated by early Americans,
they decided that religious liberty does not give conscientious ob-
jectors the right to be exempt from serving in the military. If the
Smith interpretation of the free exercise clause is going to be seri-
ously challenged, therefore, it will have to be on some grounds
other than the treatment of pacifists' exemption claims in early
America.
141. The former had a provision that prohibited the government from compelling per-
sons "to do or suffer any other Act or thing, contrary to their religious Persuasion," and
the latter had a clause protecting "the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious
worship." Sources of Our Liberties, (cited in note 41, at 256, 329).
142. Bradley, (cited in note 24, at 277).
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